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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Nonprofit Organization is an entity distinct unto itself.1 It can sue and be sued.
It can enter into legal contracts. It can produce goods. It can offer services. It can make
investments. The Nonprofit Organization, as an entity distinct from its for-profit
counterparts, is organized and operates to further a philanthropic purpose.2 This purpose is
independent of and supplants the pursuit of economic gain of the founders of the
organization and those who contribute financially to the organization.3
The traditional distinction, however, between for-profits and Nonprofit
Organizations have increasingly become blurred as Nonprofit Organizations, in an effort to
achieve the mission, continue to pursue increased commercial activity in response to
economic challenges.4 To accomplish legal, ethical, and effective implementation and
continuation of a commercial venture, the members of the governing board of the
Nonprofit Organization (the ―Board‖) and other individuals with similar responsibilities and
influence to the Nonprofit Organization (together, the ―Board and Others‖) should be
aware of the roles of the duties of loyalty and care when deciding whether to enter into a
commercial venture and when managing the subsequent ongoing operations of the
organization. Too frequently, management marginalizes legal issues in favor of business
issues.5 Yet, the legalities can affect the business‘ viability and productivity depending on the
For the purposes of this article the defined term ―Nonprofit Organization‖ refers to both tax-exempt and nontax-exempt nonprofit organizations.
1

Michael W. Peregrine, Legal Concerns in Specific Health Care Delivery Settings: Nonprofit Corporate Governance, in 3
HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE 43:2 (2010) (―The concept of nonprofit status refers to a corporation formed for the
purpose of serving a public (charitable) or mutual benefit purpose, rather than the pursuit of profits.‖).
2

Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The Business and Legal Challenges of
Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 75 (2003).
3

Howard P. Tuckman, Commercialization and For-Profits in Disguise, INT‘L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL SOC‘Y 1, 1-2
(Helmut K. Anheier et al. eds., 2010) (demonstrating that nonprofits‘ serious challenge of raising funds results in
their pursuit of commercial activities); Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 73 (indicating that the ―morphing of
the nonprofit and for-profit sectors has both sides accusing the other of unfair competition. While nonprofits
are charging fees, producing and marketing typically commercial products, and otherwise looking like for-profits,
for-profits are entering the social services arena previously occupied by nonprofits alone.‖); J. Gregory Dees,
Duke Univ., Philanthropy and Enterprise: Harnessing the Power of Business and Entrepreneurship For Social
Change, Session IV: Social Enterprise and Private Enterprise (Aug. 2, 2007, 11:00-12:45 PM),
http://www.brookings.edu/global/aspen/2007dees.pdf; see also Evelyn Alicia Lewis, When Entrepreneurs of
Commercial Nonprofits Divorce: Is It Anybody’s Business? A Perspective on Individual Property Rights in Nonprofits, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1761, 1761 (1995).
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Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 70.
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information known and decisions made and, therefore, should be an integral part of
management‘s decisions to enter into and continuing to engage in a commercial venture as a
Nonprofit Organization.6
In section II, this article describes what is meant by the status of an entity as a
nonprofit business and as a tax-exempt business. In section III, this article provides a
description of the blurring of the distinction between Nonprofit Organizations and forprofits as a result of commercialism undertaken by the Nonprofit Organizations. Section IV
sets forth the concepts of corporate governance, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of care.
Further, this section provides specific examples of how the duty of loyalty and duty of care
should be effectuated with regards to a Nonprofit Organization‘s decision to enter and
continued operation in a commercial venture. Finally, section V provides the conclusions to
be drawn from this analysis and offers suggestions for future developments.

II.

THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION

The world of Nonprofit Organizations is extraordinarily diverse and competitive.
While for-profit businesses are organized and operated to pursue corporate profit and gains
for the shareholders, the Nonprofit Organization‘s purpose is its philanthropic mission;
accordingly, its organization and operation must substantially fall in line.7 To obtain the
status of ―nonprofit,‖ an organization is prohibited from distributing its profits to the
individuals who exercise control and influence over it such as officers, directors, members,
or significant stakeholders.8 Similar to for-profits, state law governs the creation and
governance of nonprofits.9 The status of an organization as a nonprofit does not necessarily
mean it is a tax-exempt organization. Rather, the types of organizations that fall under the
term ―nonprofit‖ comprise a broader population than the types of organizations that fall
under the term ―tax-exempt.‖10
While a nonprofit is a business entity created under and governed by state law, a taxexempt organization is a federal law creation, principally governed in the United States by
the Internal Revenue Code (the ―Code‖).11 In particular, Section 501 of the Code provides
the primary source for the exemption from taxation.12 Section 501(a) of the Code allows for
exemption from federal income tax for any organization that meets the criteria of Section
6

Id.

7

Peregrine, supra note 2, at 2.

8

Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 (1981).

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 75. Similarly, if the Nonprofit Organization is organized as a corporation,
like the for-profit, it will have a board of directors responsible for the management of the organization. Id.
9
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Id.

Id. (―There are a number of categories of tax exempt organizations in Section 501.‖); see also Peregrine, supra
note 2 (―Furthermore, the determination of tax-exempt status and charitable trust status are not necessarily one
and the same. A nonprofit corporation is not automatically recognized by virtue of its state incorporation as
exempt from income tax under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Conversely, the lack of tax-exempt status
under the IRC will not prevent the state regulators from concluding that all of the corporation‘s assets are held
for charitable purposes (consistent with its charitable dedication clause), notwithstanding a failure to obtain tax
exemption.‖).
11

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010) and accompanying Treasury Regulations; see PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, infra
note 111, at 10; Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 77.
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501(c) of the Code, the ―charitable exemption.‖13
Often, tax-exempt Nonprofit
Organizations are referred to as ―charitable‖ organizations. ―Charitable‖ is the actual term
used to describe one of the types of organizations that qualifies for tax-exempt status under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the word ―charitable‖ has
become accepted as a more generic term to apply to ―religious,‖ ―scientific,‖ ―educational,‖
and other similar purposes for which 501(c) applies.14 The tax-exempt status of a nonprofit
allows the organization to be exempt from the obligation to pay certain federal taxes, such as
excise tax and employment taxes, and relieves the organization of some state taxation.15
Consequent to these characteristics, this analysis would be incomplete without
integrating two key characteristics of the Nonprofit Organization. First, that a Nonprofit
Organization‘s business activities are limited to those in furtherance of its mission.16 In the
United States, most Nonprofit Organizations of import are corporations.17 This mission
limitation means that the Nonprofit Organization‘s business purpose is limited to activities
specifically set forth in its organizing documentation, namely its charter or Articles of
Incorporation.18
Second, a Nonprofit Organization must retain its profit and, bound by its mission
limitation, apply it to the purpose(s) under which the Nonprofit Organization was organized
and created.19 A Nonprofit Organization by its definition is not precluded from generating a
profit. Many actually do. Instead, a Nonprofit Organization may not distribute profit to the
directors, officers, members, or other interested parties of the Nonprofit Organization in
their private capacity.20 This ―private inurement doctrine,‖ in which the Nonprofit
Organization‘s net earnings may not inure to the benefit of private parties, is central to the
law governing Nonprofit Organizations.21 The doctrine marks a very clear line between
Nonprofit Organizations and for-profits.22 Despite this doctrine, a Nonprofit Organization
13

I.R.C. § 501(a), (c).

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 75 (―There are member-serving organizations such as social clubs,
business leagues, and labor unions. These organizations primarily exist to provide some benefit to their members
rather than the public at large. A second category is referred to as public-serving or charitable organizations.
These are organizations defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code. They quite broadly include a spectrum of
activities designed to improve the quality of life by improving arts, education, social welfare and health. Social
service nonprofit organizations are included in this definition.‖); see also Peregrine, supra note 2 (indicating that
―[i]t is important to note that a corporation need not maintain a ‗charitable‘ corporate mission in order to
maintain nonprofit status. Indeed, the laws of many states allow the incorporation of a nonprofit entity created
to benefit only a small group of persons not in need of charity (the ‗mutual benefit corporation‘).‖).
14
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Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3.
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Peregrine, supra note 2.
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Hansmann, supra note 8.
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Peregrine, supra note 2.
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Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3; see also Peregrine, supra note 2 (indicating that while it is acceptable for the
nonprofit corporation to maintain an operating surplus, that surplus must be applied towards stated charitable
purposes).
20
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Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).

DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 2–3 (1988); Lasprogata & Cotton,
supra note 3; Peregrine, supra note 2 (―It is prohibited from making distributions of profits and net earnings (other
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may still identify a legitimate concern related to the financial performance of the
organization and seek to engage in commercial activities in response to that concern. It
must not, however, lose sight of its primary purpose, its mission, and direct substantially all
of its business activity in pursuit of that purpose.

III.

COMMERCIALISM & BLURRING

It is important to not underestimate the competitive world of the Nonprofit
Organization. A Nonprofit Organization must distinguish itself. Traditionally, Nonprofit
Organizations have continued their operations in furtherance of their mission by relying on
grants from the government and private foundations, donations from private individuals,
and fees for services.23 Among other things, the challenging economic situation has
increased the need for the Nonprofit Organization to reach beyond the traditional grant and
private donation approach.24 In an effort to make themselves viable, Nonprofits
Organizations‘ activities may ―blur the boundaries‖ between Nonprofit Organizations and
for-profit enterprises by pursuing commercial methods.25 ―[C]ommercialism refers to the
process of applying business or commercial methods to an organization, usually implying
adoption of the profit motive as a prime raison d‘etre.‖26 Along this line, Nonprofit
Organizations pursuing profit-oriented business (i.e., commercialism) have characteristically
found such opportunities in printing, garments, private universities, consultancy services,
marketing cellular phones, and investing.27 Consequently, the values, mission and practices
of the Nonprofit Organizations mix with the relevant forces in the market economy.28
This move towards commercialism by Nonprofit Organizations has been attributed
to several factors beginning with the severely elevated inflation and cutbacks in funding by

than reasonable compensation for services rendered) to individuals in a controlling position such as directors,
officers, members, or founders (known as the ‗nondistribution constraint‘), or otherwise for private benefit. This
‗constraint‘ is similar to the prohibition against private inurement of the earnings of tax-exempt organizations as
provided for in the federal Treasury Regulations. The ‗nondistribution restraint‘ is most often manifested
through statutory provisions that separately set forth the types of distributions of corporate assets prior to
dissolution, types of distributions of corporate assets upon dissolution, and a general prohibition on loans to
directors and officers except (under certain circumstances) to a director who is employed by the corporation.‖)
(footnotes omitted).
23

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 68.

24

Tuckman, supra note 4, at 1-2.

Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, Introduction: NGOs Between States, Markets and Civil Society, AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 8, 11 (1997) (including ―pursuing professionalization and standardization of organizational
practices.‖). Dean Tuckman explains the need for commercialism: ―The problem is that many nonprofits have
exhausted their existing sources of revenue and this leads for a search for new revenue sources to foster stability
and growth. One such source is engaging in the same type of commercial activity that for-profit firms are
involved in which creates the risk that nonprofits start to copy nonprofits both in terms of the goals they pursue
and the way that they provide products and services. The hiring of managers from commercial enterprises may
hasten this process and ultimately undermine the fundamental justification for an organization‘s special status as a
nonprofit organization.‖ Tuckman, supra note 4, at 2.
25
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Tuckman, supra note 4, at 2.
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Fernando & Heston, supra note 25, at 14.
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Id.
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the presidential administration of Ronald Reagan.29 Over time, Nonprofit Organizations
have been required to be more self-sufficient.30 In more recent history, increased pressure
on Nonprofit Organizations to be self-sufficient has spawned from the diversion of
government funds and public attention from the nonpublic sector to the banking crisis and
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.31 ―Autonomy appears crucial for the legitimacy of the
organizations as well as their operational flexibility.‖32
Further, new Nonprofit
Organizations have outpaced the growth of private philanthropists, foundations and
companies that will financially support the activities of the Nonprofit Organizations.33 With
the increasing number of Nonprofit Organizations, the competition for the limited resources
is increasing.34 In essence, even with all the money that governments and philanthropies of
the world contribute ―there‘s just not enough money.‖35 As a result, various Nonprofit
Organizations have followed the advice of consultants and experts, and have pursued new
revenue streams, applying business techniques that resemble those of for-profits.36 Thus,
the traditional distinctions between for-profits and nonprofits have blurred as the Nonprofit
Organizations continue to pursue increased commercial activity.37
Some claim that Nonprofit Organizations act like for-profit businesses, in some
situations, by making large profits, paying elevated salaries, moving into fine offices,
investing prolifically, and employing lobbyists and other means to influence legislation.38
These critics claim that the Nonprofit Organizations are engaging in unfair competition
because Nonprofit Organizations gain an unfair advantage over their for-profit counterparts,
particularly tax-exempt organizations that may offer very similar goods or services but
benefit from the tax-exemption.39 In this way, they argue, the Nonprofit Organizations
exploit the tax-exempt status.40 One of the advantages for a tax-exempt organization under
Tuckman, supra note 4, at 1-2 (indicating that a reason there is a growth in commercial activities by nonprofits
is the serious challenge to raise funds). The traditionally clear line between for-profits and Nonprofit
Organizations continues to become increasingly blurred, and is primarily due to the economy causing serious
challenges for the nonprofit to raise funds the traditional way, necessitating a more commercialized approach.
Id.: see also Fernando & Heston, supra note 25.
29
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Tuckman, supra note 4.
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Id.
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Fernando & Heston, supra note 25, at 14.

33

Tuckman, supra note 4.

34

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 68.

Grants & Grantees, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/ grants (last
visited Mar. 3, 2011) (―It will take much more—and more will have to come from private investment capital.‖).
35

Fernando & Heston, supra note 25; Tuckman, supra note 4, at 2. This process may also involve hiring people
from the for-profit sector. Id.
36

37

Lewis, supra note 4.

Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski, Atlanta Business: Non-Profit Organizations Tax-exempt Status Shortchanges U.S.
of Billions, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 9, 1993, at F1; see also Heather Gottry, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service
Organizations & Social Entrepreneurship, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 249, 250 (1999); Tuckman, supra note 4,
at 2.
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section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is that the contributions or gifts made to the
tax-exempt organization or for its benefit are deductible from the donor‘s taxes.41 This
becomes an added benefit to the tax-exempt organization because it incentivizes giving to
the organization.42 The public policy purpose behind this tax deduction is to support the
notion that these organizations generally serve a public purpose that the government wants
to encourage.43 Other than the mere fact that the benefit inures to the public, the
government‘s view is that it also benefits from the public purpose when it does not have to
otherwise dispense funds to meet the need addressed by the 501(c)(3) organization.44
The critical perspective is that if the Nonprofit Organizations can so readily develop
commercial ventures, they should not benefit from the privileges associated with the use of
the terminology ―nonprofit‖ that engenders trust and the federal tax-exempt status.45 In
fact, the Nonprofit Organizations may be in violation of the requirements for use of the
―nonprofit‖ term and the ability to claim tax-exempt status.46 When benefitting from the
status of being a Nonprofit (such as tax breaks), how does an organization ethically and
legally also avidly pursue commercialism, whereby the company achieves a degree of unfair
competition over for-profit companies?47
From a Nonprofit Organization‘s perspective, commercialism is required for the
nonprofit to keep up, replacing federal funds that were lost due to budget cuts and economic
issues.48 In addition, in order to achieve a healthy organization, Nonprofit Organizations are
pursuing diversified sources of income.49 The tax-exempt nonprofits further argue that they
are taxed on the income they earn for activities that are unrelated to the tax-exempt purpose
for which they have the tax-exemption. In response, the critics hold that the tax does not
adequately compensate for the advantage derived.50

IV.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

As seen above, there are fundamental differences between the for-profit
organization and the Nonprofit Organization deriving primarily from the concepts of
41

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 76.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

Id. at 73 (indicating that the ―‗morphing‘ of the nonprofit and for-profit sectors has both sides accusing the
other of unfair competition. While nonprofits are charging fees, producing and marketing typically commercial
products, and otherwise looking like for-profits, for-profits are entering the social services arena previously
occupied by nonprofits alone.‖)
45

46

Id.

Allan Maram, Commercilization of the Nonprofit Sector: A Discussion and Critical Analysis, 2 SOC. & PUB. POL‘Y REV.,
no. 2, at 1, 3 (2008).
47

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 73-74 (―In their defense, nonprofit leaders argue that they have been
forced into the positions they are in by the harsh and unforgiving fiscal environment and the need for more
capital to stay alive, let alone compete.‖).
48

49

Gottry, supra note 38.

Id. at 250-51 (indicating that the argument points to the advantage to be derived relating to the gains from the
activities that do fulfill the tax-exempt purpose).
50
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mission limitation and the private inurement doctrine requiring allocation of profit back to
the mission.51 Despite these differences, however, there are parallels. One parallel area in
particular is the duties and responsibilities of the Board and Others52 of the organization
with regard to corporate governance.53
Through efforts to ensure transparency,
accountability, and fairness of the business entity‘s dealings, the requirements of corporate
governance ultimately seek to ensure that the business entity performs successfully for its
shareholders, in the case of for-profit companies, and for the mission in the interests of the
public, in the case of Nonprofit Organizations. In recent years, due to corporate
malfeasance, businesses have come under a great deal of scrutiny. Corporate governance
took on a new life after virtual obscurity, when in light of various massive cases of corporate
malfeasance, governments implemented significantly more onerous requirements to thwart
the perceived improper, if not illegal, behavior of business management.54
Some argue that the Internal Revenue Service (the ―IRS‖), regulating primarily
through public disclosure, has become the leader in Nonprofit Organization governance
reform.55 In 2008, the IRS issued a position paper concerning governance and, in particular,
the 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization.56 In that position paper, the IRS stated that it does
―not require charities to have governance and management policies,‖ but ―will review an
organization‘s application for exemption and annual information returns to determine
whether the organization has implemented policies relating to executive compensation,
conflicts of interest, investments, fundraising, documenting governance decisions, document

51

Peregrine, supra note 2.

While aspects of the analysis in this section may emphasize the Board‘s duties, this discussion is meant to be
relevant to the duties of the Board and Others, essentially any individual that owes a fiduciary duty to the
Nonprofit Organization, including if there is another form of management authority other than a board of
directors.
52

Some state statutes provide limited liability for officers, directors, and other persons serving nonprofit entities
without compensation; see e.g., Illinois General Not For Profit Act of 1986: Limited Liability of Directors,
Officers, Board Members, & Persons Without Compensation Ill. Comp. Stat. § 108.70 (1986).
53

THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT DO BOARDS DO? 4 (Chris Cornforth
ed., 2003) [hereinafter Cornforth]; see also Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 72-73 (―In the meantime, with
scandals like the United Way of America and the recent Red Cross embarrassment in New York City, attention
has been focused on nonprofit efficiency and accountability.‖).
54

See Lisa A. Runquist & Michael E. Malamut, The IRS’s New Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 18 BUS. L. TODAY
29, 30, 33 (2009); see also I.R.S. POSITION PAPER, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS – 501(C)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS (Feb. 4 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf. The
Position Paper is structured as a discussion of six specific governance topics: (i) Mission; (ii) Organizational
Documents; (iii) Governing Body; (iv) Governance and Management Policies; (v) Financial Statements and Form
990 Reporting; and (vi) Transparency. Id. The discussion reflects governance themes from both the several
public speeches of recent months by IRS Commissioner Steven Miller, as well as those from Parts VI and XI
from the new Form 990 for fiscal year 2008. In this way, the Position Paper significantly updates and expands
upon the February 2007 discussion draft of ―Good Governance Practices‖ for charitable organizations, which
has now been withdrawn from the IRS web site. Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 44; see also I.R.S. FORM 990: RETURN
OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2010). If required to file the Form 990, a Nonprofit
Organization will need to file it annually with the IRS. Runquist, supra note 55, at 29. Many states also require an
annual filing of the Form 990 as well. Id. ―The resulting IRS foray into corporate governance is simplistic;
neither the form nor the instructions recognize the many problems that may result from the revised form.‖ Id.
55
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I.R.S. POSITION PAPER, supra note 55.
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retention and destruction, and whistleblower claims.‖57 The implied result is that a properly
organized and operated nonprofit will have governance and management policies.
Even with the IRS‘s efforts, corporate governance of Nonprofit Organizations has
been mostly managed by state law.58 The law applicable to Nonprofit Organization is quite
underdeveloped compared to the law of for-profits.59 State laws concerning Nonprofit
Organizations, in the area of directors‘ and officers‘ duties and responsibilities and other
areas, have been modeled after state laws concerning for-profit organizations, most notably
the Model Business Corporation Act and other laws governing corporations.60 As a result,
directors of Nonprofit Organizations must operate under a standard of fiduciary duty similar
to that of the directors of for-profit corporations.61 At the state level, the attorney general is
most frequently the authority responsible for regulatory oversight of Nonprofit
Organizations and the Board and Others, including those who raise funds or other assets for
the organization within that particular state.62 In addition, in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, some states have proposed laws that apply Sarbanes-Oxley-type corporate
governance provisions to Nonprofit Organizations.63 In terms of state‘s general

57

Id. at § 4; see also I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 55.

58

Runquist & Malamut, supra note 55, at 29.

59

Hansmann, supra note 8, at 500.

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 3 (―It should be noted, however, that nonprofit corporation law has traditionally
been significantly affected by developments in business corporate law. Nonprofit corporate law began to
converge with business corporation law in the early twentieth century. Many state nonprofit corporation statutes
were based in large part on the state business corporation law, particularly with respect to administrative
management, corporate bylaws, internal procedures, and qualification and renewal of board members. Indeed,
the drafters of the American Bar Association‘s (ABA‘s) Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 3d Edition (MNPCA)
closely followed the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), as appropriate, including
provisions dealing with secretary of state filings, corporate formation, corporate powers, foreign corporation
qualification, requirements for a corporate office and agent, and merger/dissolution procedures. Furthermore,
the MNPCA adopts (with few exceptions) the provisions of the MBCA with respect to the standards that govern
the conduct of nonprofit directors. Under this view, directors of nonprofit corporations should be held to the
standards of directors of business corporations (as opposed, for example, to standards applicable to trustees of
charitable trusts). This is held without regard of the fact that directors of nonprofit corporations are not in
comparable positions to, or operating under similar circumstances as, their for-profit counterparts, due to the
differences in corporate goals.‖) (citations omitted).
60

Id. (stating ―litigation is conducted, contracts are executed, and money is borrowed all in the name of the
nonprofit corporation itself, rather than in the name of individual trustees, just as in the case of business
corporations. In addition, adoption by most states of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds
Act (UPMIFA) confirms the application of traditional corporate law principles to financial investment practices
of charitable corporations (particularly with regard to UPMIFA‘s shift away from a ‗legal list‘ of approved types
of investments.‖).
61

62

Id. at § 40.

ABA COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO NONPROFIT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF SARBANES-OXLEY, Forward (2005) (indicating that California was the first to pass
such legislation). But see James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29
VA. TAX REV. 545, 576 (2010) (indicating that despite the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 does not
apply directly to Nonprofit Organizations, many organizations have been willing to adopt the associated
reforms).
63
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corporations statutes, Delaware law is noteworthy for a variety of reasons, including the fact
that it has a corporations code that applies to both for-profit and nonprofit corporations.64
Nonprofit Organizations have come under a great deal of scrutiny for a number of
reasons, including their move into commercialism.65 In recent years, many Nonprofit
Organizations have not adequately incorporated corporate governance requirements.66 In
light of that, the decision of a Nonprofit Organization to engage in commercial activities and
methods is a complicated one and, therefore, implicates the duties associated with corporate
governance. The deeper a Nonprofit Organization‘s efforts towards commercialism
become, the more involved management should be and the more sensitive the situation is
for corporate governance purposes. Moving into commercialism requires an evaluation of
several factors such as tax considerations, ideology, measuring of success, federal law, state
law, and structural ramifications, the details of which would not necessarily be relevant in a
for-profit venture.67
Corporate governance derives from the basic fiduciary relationship at the core of the
business entity. In the case of a Nonprofit Organization, this involves its Board, committees
of the Board with delegated powers, and individuals with similar roles or functions, such as
officers and other senior management (cumulatively referred to as ―the Board and
Others‖).68 Those responsible for corporate governance are charged with the fiduciary
Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 37 (stating ―Delaware cases are worthy of note by nonprofit corporations because
of the number of businesses incorporated in Delaware, the volume of business controversies litigated in
Delaware courts, the strength of its judiciary (including a specialized court, the Chancery Court, that has
jurisdiction over cases arising under its corporate laws), and the fact that it has a unified corporation code
applicable to for-profit and nonprofit corporations alike. Furthermore, Delaware decisions often address alleged
violations of fiduciary duty that closely resemble those duties owed by directors of nonprofit corporations.
Accordingly, rulings of Delaware courts on issues of director conduct can be particularly informative to nonprofit
organizations—and those who regulate them—even where those organizations are not governed by Delaware
law.‖).
64

ABA COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 63; see also Gottry, supra note 38, at 249-50 (indicating that
scandals such as with Jim Bakker, Pat Robertson and United Way of America have also contributed to the
scrutiny); Runquist & Malamut, supra note 55, at 29 (―In light of the Enron debacle and parallel scandals in the
nonprofit world, Congress and the IRS have put nonprofits, and specifically nonprofit governance, under the
microscope. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) instituted federal corporate governance oversight of public companies.‖).
65

Richard Wallace, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: Playing the Game by the Rules (Oct. 1, 2002) (unpublished paper,
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/45687493/Nonprofit-Corporate-Governance). For example, the
non-profits maintained many directors in management positions. Id. Towards this end, a goal of corporate
governance for both non-profit and for-profit companies is to achieve a board of directors that is primarily
independent of the company and can guide the non-profit ethically and legally. Id. A director that is also
company management is not independent and represents a source of conflict. Id.
66

Gottry, supra note 38, at 251; see also, Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 2 (―Most state nonprofit corporation statutes
also provide for an entity‘s perpetual duration and a broad recitation of general powers, including a nonexclusive
list of specific powers (e.g., to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its affairs, including without
limitation, power to [recite in statute specific powers]. These statutes also typically authorize the corporation to
do all things necessary or convenient, not inconsistent with law, to further the activities and affairs of the
corporation. These provisions are designed in large part to (a) protect against the situation where a court
incorrectly determines that a nonprofit corporation lacks a specific power because it was not enumerated in its
Articles of Incorporation; and (b) relieve the drafter from being required to recite general corporate powers in the
Articles of Incorporation.‖).
67

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 4 (indicating that ―federal courts, as well as the courts of virtually every state, have
ruled on the matter, generally considering the existence of a fiduciary relationship of fact‖).
68
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duty.69 As the individual ultimately responsible for the management of the business of the
organization, a director must perform fiduciary duties with the awareness that he acts on
behalf of others. In the case of a Nonprofit Organization, this includes the public.70 Those
with a fiduciary duty must take steps that amount to more than the mere absence of bad
faith or fraud.71 Rather, they must establish rules, systems, and business practices that ensure
the transparency, accountability, and fairness of the entity‘s business dealings.72
In the recent case of Health Alliance of Greater Cincinnati v. Christ Hospital, the court
determined that a fiduciary is a person that has a duty to act primarily for the benefit of
another.73 The duty is created by one person‘s undertaking of some matter and is related to
that undertaking.74 In the case of a Nonprofit Organization, the Board and Others act on
behalf of the Nonprofit Organization. Further, the ultimate body to whom the Nonprofit
Organization is accountable is the public.75 This underscores the necessity that a Nonprofit
Organization clearly set forth the relevant, individual responsibilities and requirements of the
Board and Others.76 As determined by the Health Alliance case:
A fiduciary relationship is formed when special confidence and trust is
reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another and there is a resulting
position and superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this special trust.
A fiduciary relationship may be created outside of a contractual relationship
where both parties understand that a special trust or confidence has been
reposed. The law has been zealous in guarding against abuse of a fiduciary
relationship.77
69

Id. at § 5.

MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (hereinafter ―MNPCA‖) § 8.01(b) (2008) (―Except as provided in Section 8.12,
all corporate powers must be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the nonprofit
corporation, and the activities and affairs of the corporation must be managed by or under the direction, and
subject to the oversight, of its board of directors.‖); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2010) (stating ―[t]he
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.
If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed
upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or
persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.‖); Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 390 (Del. Ch.
1961); Loft v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
70

71

Guth, 2 A.2d at 239.

EDWARDS, ANGELL, PALMER & DODGE, LLP & ROGER D. GLENN, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PUBLIC
COMPANIES, at Exhibit F (2009).
72

See Health Alliance of Greater Cincinnati v. Christ Hosp., No. C-070426, 2008 WL 4394738, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 30, 2008).
73

74

Id.

See Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 3 (―Furthermore, net profits in business corporations are distributable to
shareholders who own the for-profit on a collective basis. In contrast, no individual possesses an ownership or
proprietary interest in a nonprofit corporation, the ultimate beneficiary of which is the general public.‖).
75

76

See Cornforth, supra note 54, at 5.

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 4 (citing Health Alliance, 2008 WL 4394738, at *6); see generally EDWARDS, ANGELL,
PALMER & DODGE, LLP, supra note 72; HEALTHCARE ASS‘N OF N.Y. STATE & HEALTHCARE TRS. OF NEW YORK
STATE, NON-PROFIT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: A GUIDEBOOK (2004); Wallace, supra note 66. Both the
collaborating nonprofit and for-profit company face similar ethical and legal corporate governance requirements,
77
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The fiduciary relationship of the Board and Others obligates them to fulfill their
duties of loyalty and care in good faith to ensure the Nonprofit Organization follows the
mission limitation and properly allocates profits.78 For a tax-exempt nonprofit in particular,
it is the Board and Others‘ responsibility to ensure that the organization meets, and
continues to qualify for, the tax-exemption by adhering to the Code requirements of section
501(c)(3), along with the related Treasury Regulations.79
Consistent with their duties, the Board and Others need to perform a two-layer
analysis: 1) organizational and 2) operational.80 At the first layer, a Nonprofit Organization
must be organized with a mission limitation and a profit allocation appropriate to the
mission.81 Tax-exempt nonprofits must have been organized exclusively for one or more of
the charitable purposes of section 501(c)(3).82 This has been referred to as the
Organizational Test.83 Under the Organizational Test, the focus is mostly on the nonprofit‘s
organizational documents, which must articulate a charitable purpose for the organization.84
In order for the Board and Others to perform their duty, a Nonprofit Organization
must clearly have defined its mission and values (1) so that the Board and Others know to
which standards they should hold the management of the company accountable and (2) to
ensure that the Nonprofit Organization properly uses the resources available to it, which will
influence its stated purpose.85 A Nonprofit Organization, despite a legitimate concern with
financial performance, should primarily be focused on the pursuit of its articulated mission
in light of its purpose, as the forming document (which will be the Articles of Incorporation
if the organization is a corporation) narrowly or broadly defines it.86 In this regard, a
Nonprofit Organization may conduct a commercial activity that supports a philanthropic

including separation of powers between management and the board of directors, creating a code of ethics,
implementing an audit committee with its own charters, creating a conflicts of interest policy, establishing internal
controls, reporting financial and other key information to the board, regulating compensation and monitoring
interested party transactions.
Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 10. A discussion of good faith is also relevant to the analysis of duty of care. The
good faith element of the fiduciary duty is the requirement that the individual acts with honest intention,
openness and fair dealing. Relevant to the performance of this obligation, the individual should consider, among
other things, whether 1) his actions reflect honesty and fairness consistent with the individual‘s duty and
obligations to the nonprofit; 2) his actions reflect an intention to take advantage of the nonprofit in violation of
his duty of loyalty; and 3) he believed his actions and decisions were in the best interest of the nonprofit. Id.
Under these standards, the assets of the nonprofit must not inure to the benefit of insiders (―private inurement
doctrine‖), nor shall a private benefit be conferred on an outsider (―private benefit doctrine‖). Lasprogata &
Cotton, supra note 3, at 77 (―It must not participate in any campaign for political office, or engage in any attempts
to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities (together referred to as political activity).‖).
78

79

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 76.

80

See id. at 77-80.

81

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 2.

82

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 78-80.

83

Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) – 1(a)(1).

84

Id.

85

See Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 2.

86

See Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 77.
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purpose.87 Compliance with the articulated purpose in the organizational documents and
avoidance of mission drift during operation can be influenced by how the organizational
documents articulate the purpose(s) of the Nonprofit Organization.88 Consequently, some
states allow Nonprofit Organizations to disclose a purpose that is more general in nature,
which in turn, encompasses more activities within Nonprofit Organization‘s mission
limitation.89
Similarly, a Nonprofit Organization must continue to follow the mission limitation
in its operation and properly allocate profits, pursuant to the private inurement doctrine.90 A
Nonprofit Organization‘s activities must remain substantially dedicated to the philanthropic
purpose.91 A tax-exempt nonprofit, again, must operate exclusively for the purpose of one
or more of the charitable purposes of 501(c)(3).92 In addition, a tax-exempt nonprofit must
report and pay taxes on any unrelated business income.93 This has been referred to as the
Operational Test.94
These factors are very important for corporate governance
considerations in a Nonprofit Organization. The Board and Others (particularly the Board)
are obligated in good faith to manage these factors, pursuant to their fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care when 1) deciding to enter into a commercial venture and 2) on an on-going
basis.
A.

Duty of Loyalty

The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act mandates that a director shall discharge his
or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as a member of a committee, in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation.95 This
duty of loyalty arises from the position of trust and confidence held by the Board and
Others.96 The duty of loyalty requires the Board and Others to subordinate their personal
interests in good faith to those of the Nonprofit Organization and its mission.97 The duty of
loyalty prohibits the Board and Others from using their positions at the Nonprofit
Organization or the Nonprofit Organization‘s confidential information for financial gain for
themselves or a third party, including another Nonprofit Organization.98 The courts have

87

See id.

88

Id.

89

Peregrine, supra note 2, at.§ 21.

90

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 74.

91

Id. at 78.

92

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 76-77.

93

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 82-83.

94

Id. at 78. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.50(c)(3)-1(a)(1).

95

MNPCA § 8.30(a).

See Health Alliance of Greater Cincinnati v. Christ Hosp., No. C-070426, 2008 WL 4394738 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008); see I.R.S. POSITION PAPER, supra note 55, at § 4(B) (stating that directors owe a duty of loyalty); ABA
COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 29; Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 23.
96

97

See MNPCA § 8.30(a); ABA COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 29.

98

KURTZ, supra note 22, at 59; Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 23.
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more closely scrutinized the application of the duty of loyalty versus the duty of care.99
Governed by the duty of loyalty, a director must act in good faith and with a reasonable belief to
―maintain: (a) unequivocal allegiance to the corporate mission; and (b) personal disinterest
when considering the business affairs of the corporation.‖100 To determine good faith, the
courts typically use a ―facts and circumstances‖ analysis; the essence of the analysis being the
director‘s state of mind.101 While the analysis applies specifically to directors, it should be
considered relevant to the entire Board and Others.
Courts will also analyze whether a director, and the Board and Others more broadly,
acted with the reasonable belief that a decision was in the best interests of the Nonprofit
Organization.102
In evaluating compliance with this ‗reasonable belief‘ standard, courts will
apply both an objective and substantive test. The objective component of
the analysis is that the director must reasonably believe the action is in the best
interest of the corporation. The subjective component is that the director
must actually believe the action to be in the corporation‘s best interests. As
with the ‗good faith‘ requirement, courts will likely apply a facts and
circumstances analysis to evaluate compliance with the ‗reasonable belief‘
requirement.103
For the Board and Others, the duty of loyalty also involves such concepts as the
conflict of interest, protecting confidential information from disclosure, appropriation of a
business opportunity, the unlawful distribution of corporate assets, and in certain
jurisdictions, the making of loans and guarantees.104
Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 22 (indicating that the business judgment rule weighs in favor of finding fulfillment
of the duty of care). ―The definition of the duty of loyalty reflects application of a general corporate law standard
in evaluating compliance, rather than the stricter ‗trust‘ standard. This is consistent with its approach to the duty
of care. The principal difference between a corporate-based approach and a trustee-based approach to duty of
loyalty violations is in the area of remedy. Under the corporate law approach, courts typically require the
breaching director to restore the appropriated corporate opportunity or reimburse the corporation for the benefit
received as the case may be. Under a trust approach, a court may require not only that the breaching director
return lost profits to the corporation, but may also impose a constructive trust on the diverted property for the
benefit of the corporation.‖ Id. at § 25.
99

Id. at § 22 (―Because a breach of the duty of loyalty involves a potential subversion of the charitable nature of
a charitable nonprofit organization (i.e., absence of self-interest), historically, courts have closely scrutinized
related director conduct. The standard of review in such cases focuses more on fundamental fairness to the
corporation than on the decision-making process of governance and management. This is in contrast to the duty
of care, in the application of which courts will often apply the business judgment rule to protect decisions made
in good faith by a disinterested director, reasonably informed under the circumstances, who rationally believed
the decision to be in the best interests of the corporation.‖). Id.
100

REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30, comment 5 (1987). This analysis includes ―whether his or
her conduct evidenced honesty and faithfulness to the director‘s fiduciary duties, or an intent to make personal
gain for the director, or for a third party.‖ Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 24.
101

102

MNPCA § 8.30(a)(2).

103

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 25 (emphasis in original).

Id. ―Accordingly, the duty of loyalty owed by a nonprofit corporate director also includes an obligation to
maintain the confidentiality of all information regarding the activities of the corporation until the activities are
disclosed to the public by the corporation or are otherwise in the public milieu. This facet of the duty of loyalty
presumes that the director is not the corporate spokesman, and that disclosure of corporate activities is properly
104
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Many state laws require that a conflict of interest must be approved by the
disinterested directors and shareholders.105 Section 5.02 of the American Law Institute‘s
Principles of Corporate Governance differs slightly, emphasizing the fairness of the overall
transaction. The text requires full disclosure of the transaction and the conflict of interest
thereto.106 Then, the conflict of interest must be authorized or ratified by disinterested
directors.107 If the disinterested directors refuse to authorize the transaction, the individual
with the conflict of interest must show that the transaction was fair.108 Under the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance, even if a majority of directors approve a decision to
engage in a commercial venture after full disclosure of conflicts had been made, the decision
may not be valid if it is deemed to not have been reasonably fair to the organization at the
time that it was made.109 If the disinterested directors approve the transaction, then a party
challenging the decision must show that the transaction is a waste of corporate assets.110
In circumstances of a Nonprofit Organization‘s commercial venture, the duty of
loyalty may come under particular scrutiny at the point when the Board and Others make the
decision to enter into the commercial venture.111 ―A conflict of interest arises when a board
member or staff person‘s duty of loyalty to the [Nonprofit] organization comes into conflict
with a competing financial or personal interest that he or she (or a relative) may have in a
proposed transaction.‖112 The duty of loyalty would command, among other things, that an
individual with the duty disclose any conflict of interest that he may have.113 For instance, a
the province of a designated individual, to whom the director should defer with respect to dissemination of
confidential information. The director is further obligated to use ‗reasonable diligence to protect and safeguard‘
corporate information and may not use it for personal gain. Injunctive relief is a method often used by
corporations to protect against director breach of confidentiality.‖ Id. at § 32.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 144 (2010); see also WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 3 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW OF CORPS. § 915.20 (2011) (citing 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02, comment a
(2010)).
105

THE
106

FLETCHER, supra note 105, at § 915.20 (citing 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02(b)).

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id. (citing 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02(a)(2)(B)).

110

Id. (citing 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02(a)(2)(D)).

PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE
FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS 9 (2007).
111

112

Id.

See Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 35 (citing Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat‘l Training Sch. for Deaconesses &
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1020 (D.D.C. 1974)) (explaining that ―(a) knowingly permitting the corporation
to enter into a business transaction with any corporation in which the trustee has a material interest without
previously Informing the board or appropriate committee reviewing the transaction of the trustee‘s interest
therein and of any significant facts known to the trustee which might suggest that the transaction might not be in
the corporations best interests; (b) actively participating in (or voting in favor of) the decision of a board,
committee or subcommittee to transacting business with a corporation in which the trustee has a material
interest; or (c) otherwise failing to perform his duties honestly, in good faith, and with reasonable diligence and
care‖ violates a trustee‘s fiduciary duty of loyalty). ―The impact of Judge Gesell‘s conclusion was diminished in
part by his decision not to impose relief such as monetary damages or the removal of the implicated directors due
to the absence of evidence of financial harm. Instead, he ordered a series of internal compliance actions designed
to enhance the board‘s awareness of, and adherence to, duty of care and loyalty obligations as they may be
implicated in future transactions. There is, accordingly, a danger of applying a ―no harm, no foul‖ caveat to the
113
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director may have a financial interest in the outcome of the commercial venture. Or, the
commercial venture may involve another entity on whose Board the director serves as a
director or an officer. Also, a family member might hold a similar position. A key point to
keep in mind is that the Nonprofit Organization should have clear and appropriate
procedures to address conflicts of interest and, at the appropriate time when deciding to
engage in a commercial venture, the organization should follow them.114 The procedures
should be applicable to anyone who has the ability to influence decisions made on behalf of
the Nonprofit Organization.115
B.

Duty of Care

In its 2008 Position Paper on Corporate Governance, the IRS emphasized the duty
of care through its encouragement of ―an active and engaged board‖ explaining that ―it is
important to the success of a charity and to its compliance with applicable law.‖116 The
application of the duty of care can be broken down into two categories: 1) decision making
and 2) oversight.117 ―Decision making‖ applies to the instances when the Board, along with
management, makes a specific decision or pursues a specific action.118 ―Oversight‖ refers to
the general role of the board of directors in overseeing the management of the day-to-day
operations of the nonprofit‘s business.119 The oversight function, while ultimately the
Board‘s responsibility, is shared with the corporate management. Board oversight is an ongoing obligation of the Board and Others. Generally, a director should consider the
following steps, among others: 1) understand his fiduciary duties to the organization; 2)
continue to be informed about these duties and the organization in general; 3) do not take
things at face value, but instead be skeptical and ask questions; and 4) when making

duty of loyalty based upon the Stern decision. Such a caveat is inappropriate in the context of today‘s highly
regulated health care financial environment given the enormous economic pressure placed upon nonprofit health
care corporations and the potential serious harm to a corporation from its unknowing participation in a conflict
of interest transaction.‖ Id.
PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 111 (indicating that ―[e]stablishing and enforcing a conflict-ofinterest policy is an important part of protecting charitable organizations from unethical or illegal practices. The
policy need not be complex, but it must be consistent with the laws of the state in which the nonprofit is
organized and should be tailored to specific organizational needs and characteristics.‖); see also I.R.S. POSITION
PAPER, supra note 55, at § 4(B) (indicating that the IRS encourages nonprofits to adopt and regularly evaluate a
written conflict of interest policy ―that requires directors and staff to act solely in the interests of the charity
without regard for personal interests; includes written procedures for determining whether a relationship,
financial interest, or business affiliation results in a conflict of interest; and prescribes a course of action in the
event a conflict of interest is identified.‖); I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023: APPLICATION FOR
RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(c)(3) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2006) (providing
an example of a conflicts of interest policy).
114

115

PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 111.

116

I.R.S. POSITION PAPER, supra note 55, at § 3.

117

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 16.

118

Id.

119

Id.
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decisions and applying judgment, use complete, undivided loyalty and care towards the
organization and disclose conflicts for approval.120
The oversight and decision-making aspects of the duty of care are relevant first to
the Nonprofit Organization‘s decision to enter into a commercial venture and, second, to
the ongoing operations relevant to the commercial venture. First, the decision to enter into
a commercial venture triggers the Board‘s decision-making obligations pursuant to the duty
of care. The decision-making obligation necessitates that those holding the duty of care be
reasonably informed when making decisions.121 There is no defined prescription to
effectuate this responsibility and, certainly, no rubric has been provided for analyzing a
Nonprofit Organization‘s move into commercialism. The decision-making obligation of the
Board and Others of a Nonprofit Organization does not differ greatly from that of a forprofit organization.122 However, there are key issues singularly relevant to a Nonprofit
Organization given the very nature of the organization. The more potential profit the
commercial venture offers to the Nonprofit Organization, the more potential there is for
risk. The Board and Others need to consider the risks of the commercial venture and
determine whether those risks are worth the ultimate financial, and otherwise, benefit to the
Nonprofit Organization.123 When contemplating the move by a Nonprofit Organization
into commercialism, the following considerations are relevant for decision making: 1) what
the risks of the commercial venture are and whether the Nonprofit Organization can afford
to take those risks; 2) what is needed from the Nonprofit Organization for the commercial
venture and whether the nonprofit can afford to meet the needs; 3) how the culture of the
Nonprofit Organization aligns with the culture and goals of the commercial venture; and 4)
what the timeline of the venture is and whether the Nonprofit Organization can meet it.124
Under the first consideration, the Nonprofit Organization should analyze the risks
of the commercial venture and their effect on its bottom line, the organization, and its
reputation.125 The second consideration requires Nonprofit Organization management to
look at the skills, knowledge and resources required for the venture and whether the
Nonprofit Organization has the ability to supply them.126 Management should compare the
needs requested to the value of the potential benefit of the collaboration. In this way, the
approach that may make sense to Nonprofit Organization management would be to wade in
gradually to collaborations and evaluate the costs and risks as it moves further along in
collaborations.127 The Nonprofit Organization‘s third consideration requires an evaluation
See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 111, at 8 (indicating ―they should be familiar with the basic
rules and requirements with which their organization must comply and should secure the necessary legal advice
and assistance to structure appropriate monitoring and oversight mechanisms‖); Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 6.
120

121

Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 15.

122

See id.

123

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 70.

Id. at 87-88 (―However, social service nonprofit organizations vary dramatically both in their objectives and in
how they achieve those objectives in their day-to-day operations. This makes it very difficult to identify one or
more entrepreneurial strategies that are uniformly appropriate.‖). Id. at 88.
124

125

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 87.

126

Id.

127

Id.
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of the organization‘s values and mission compared to those of the venture. The Board and
Others needs to decide if they align. If not, the Board and Others need to decide if the
organization can adapt.128 This begs a careful consideration of the potential for mission
drift.129 Fourthly, the Nonprofit Organization needs to consider the timeline for the venture
and whether it can function within that timeline. Effective planning is essential for this
determination.130 Planning requires a full and detailed understanding of the marketplace for
the commercial venture and evaluation of the risks and corresponding preventative
approaches.131
Essential to the analysis of the duty of care is the role of the business judgment
rule.132 To determine if a director has met his or her duty of care, the court may apply the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is designed to ensure that directors
have plenty of opportunity to sufficiently exercise their power to manage the business affairs
of the organization pursuant to the powers granted to them under the relevant statutes.133
Pursuant to the business judgment rule, a director will not be liable for a good faith decision
he or she has made if the director: a) was disinterested (i.e. no conflicts or self-dealing); b)
was reasonably informed about the circumstances relevant to the situation; and c) rationally
believed the decision to be made in the best interests of the organization.134 If these
standards are met, a court will generally not question a director‘s decision unless clearly
irrational.135 In order for this to occur, actual business judgment must have been
exercised.136 A director must perform reasonable diligence in order to be able to exercise
business judgment.137 This includes a director informing himself of ―all the material

Id. at 87-88 (―This is a principal concern for many social service nonprofit organizations that value service and
public participation over the bottom line. To many nonprofit staff, ‗earning money‘ is offensive. In recent years,
resistance to the idea of entrepreneurship in nonprofits has diminished due to increased familiarity with the
opportunities and immediate financial pressures.‖).
128

129

See discussion of mission drift, infra note 165.

130

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 88.

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 88. This requires an understanding of the marketplace and the
organizational resources at hand. In other words, it requires good planning. Obviously, hasty decision-making
and inadequate planning lay the groundwork for failure in any venture. Id.
131

132

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).

133

Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).

See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 54 (Del. 1989); Michael W. Peregrine
& James R. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule and Other Protections for Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33 J.
HEALTH L. 422, 465 (2000).
134

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (finding that the rule ―is a presumption that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company‖); see generally Peregrine & Schwartz, supra
note 134, at 466 (indicating that while the Rule is not easily transposed to the nonprofit context, the drafters of
the Revised Model Act, several courts, and a number of observers have all supported such applications).
135

See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that ―[a]pplication of the [business
judgment] rule of necessity depends upon a showing that informed directors did in fact make a business
judgment authorizing the transaction under review‖).
136

See, e.g., Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. App. 828, 851 (1st Dist. 1965); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
137
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information reasonably available to [him]‖ before making the business decision.138 As a
result, the director cannot ignore what is going on with a Nonprofit Organization, including
commercial activities or mission drift.139 Accordingly, in order to find that the business
judgment rule does not apply, in some jurisdictions, a claimant must rebut the presumption
that the decision was an informed decision and establish that the director acted in bad
faith.140 The court in Smith v. Van Gorkom, under the business judgment rule, articulated that
the standard to determine a director‘s liability requires a showing of gross negligence.141
In the case of those with a duty of care to the Nonprofit Organization evaluating
the decision to enter into commercial activities, the business judgment rule would not
protect the decision if, as in the case of Van Gorkom, the decision makers breached their duty
of care ―(1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to
them and relevant to their decision . . . and (2) by their failure to disclose all material
information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important.‖142 The ―informed
decision‖ analysis will be performed based on whether the directors were informed as of the
time the decision was made.143 Further, if the decision was not informed at the time it was
made, under the Van Gorkom approach, a court may look to the actions that the individual
with the duty took subsequent to the decision being made.144
In light of this standard, the decision to commercialize should include the evaluation
of several factors to determine whether or not it is likely that the organization will encounter
risks but also, importantly, the general conclusion as to whether the venture will be
successful. For instance, the Board and Others need to determine if the commercial venture
aligns with and will not interfere with the mission and goals of the organization.145 The
Board and Others should consider whether there is a market to consume the product or
service offered by the commercial venture, and whether the Nonprofit Organization will
have products or services to meet the needs of the market for the commercial venture.146
Moreover, at a basic level, the Board and Others should consider whether the Nonprofit
Organization needs additional revenue and whether the commercial venture will achieve the
necessary revenue and not taint the Nonprofit Organization with overly prohibitive risk,

138

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.

139

Id.

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
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Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
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Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
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See id. at 875.

144

Id.
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Tuckman, supra note 4, at 505.

Id. Since not all organizations will make the ultimate decision to engage in a commercial venture: ―The
existence of these conditions suggests that the [for profit in disguise] problem will not exist throughout the
nonprofit sector but rather in those areas where commercialism is feasible and the administration begins to seek
out and provide commercial products and services. It is unlikely to be found in providers of services to abused
wives, hospices, homeless and/or animal shelters and more likely to exist for art galleries, educational institutions,
health care providers or research facilities, and museums.‖ Id.
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including the risk of a tax-exempt nonprofit losing its tax-exempt status.147 With a
commercial venture, it is not easy to find the ideal balance between using commercialism to
achieve the mission versus crossing the line into substantial efforts towards commercialism
and losing sight of the mission. This is especially true given that focusing to some degree on
commercialism may ultimately help the Nonprofit Organization achieve greater impact
towards its mission in the long run.148
Second, the oversight function of the directors will apply to the activity of the
Nonprofit Organization whilst engaging in commercial activity. Oversight requires the
directors to make a reasonable inquiry on an ongoing basis. The Nonprofit Organization is
organized and operated primarily for a philanthropic purpose and not intended to line the
pockets of the founders or those that support it financially.149
Ensuring the proper ongoing operation of the Nonprofit Organization is
challenging, especially in the context of pursuing a commercial venture as part of the
business of the organization while trying to balance the pursuit of the organization‘s mission
with the need for more funds.150 Nonprofits can earn profits but, by their nature, cannot
distribute the earnings to the directors, officers, management, members, employees or other
interested parties to the organization.151 For both the tax-exempt and non-tax-exempt
nonprofit, the company‘s continuing operations must be devoted to the purpose or purposes
articulated in the organizational documents (mission limitation), and it must properly allocate
profits towards that mission.152 This is particularly relevant in two ways. First, the
commercialism by the Nonprofit Organization, as articulated by critics, takes the
organization into a new realm possibly adverse to the purely philanthropic activities in
support of the mission.153 This new realm may, if not done properly, violate the Nonprofit
Organization‘s status as a nonprofit and/or tax-exempt entity. Second, commercialism may
be evidence of or the cause of mission drift.154
It is the Board and Others‘ duty to ensure that in its day-to-day operations, the
organization follows its organizational documents.155 If the Articles articulate an exclusive,
narrowly-defined purpose or purposes, then that may preclude the organization from
functioning in a commercial venture even if financially insubstantial.156 By its nature, a tax147

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 70.

148

Dees, supra note 4, at 10-11.
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Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 74.
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Tuckman, supra note 4, at 506.
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Id. at 77-78.
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Id. at 74.
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See Tuckman, supra note 4, at 506.

See I.R.S. POSITION PAPER, supra note 55, at § 2 (stating ―[r]egardless of whether a charity is a trust,
corporation, unincorporated association, or other type of organization, it must have organizational documents
that provide the framework for its governance and management‖).
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Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 77. ―To that end, the Articles of a social service nonprofit organization
seeking exemption from federal income tax should contain a statement of purpose that reflects the charitable
purposes identified in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Additionally, the Articles must obligate the organization to
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exempt nonprofit‘s purpose is limited. Generally, the requirements to meet the
Organizational Test are more easily fulfilled by the Board and Others because it generally
requires properly prepared Articles.157 Achieving compliance with the Operational Test
requires monitoring compliance of the Nonprofit Organization‘s business on an ongoing
basis in order to determine if the organization continues to engage in business that qualifies
as nonprofit and, if tax-exempt, ―exclusively charitable.‖158 To accomplish this task, the
Board and Others should ensure that the Nonprofit Organization has clear policies and
procedures in place that provide a means for management, staff, volunteers, clients, and
others affiliated with the Nonprofit Organization to report suspected wrongdoing without
fear of retaliatory measures.159
The organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more
exempt purposes only if it engages substantially in activities that accomplish
those purposes. If more than an insubstantial amount of the corporation‘s
activities are not in furtherance of its exempt purposes, it will not qualify as
a charitable organization defined in Section 501(c)(3).160
Pursuant to the Board and Other‘s oversight function, they should understand that there is a
critical difference between the organization‘s ―activity‖ and ―purpose.‖ Depending on the
jurisdiction and applicable law, if a Nonprofit Organization‘s primary activity is a commercial
trade or business, that does not automatically mean that the organization becomes
disqualified as a nonprofit business nor as a tax-exempt organization.161 The critical
distinction is that the commercial activity needs to be in furtherance of the Nonprofit
Organization‘s purpose to pursue its philanthropic mission.162 For a tax-exempt nonprofit,

further such exempt purposes as its primary activity and prohibit the organization from engaging in any
meaningful way in activities that are not in furtherance of some exempt purpose.‖ Id. at 77-78.
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Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 78.

158

Id.
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PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 111, at 10.

Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 78. ―Even if the corporation operates to further an exempt purpose, but
substantially engages in another activity with a non-exempt (e.g., commercial) purpose, it will fail the Operational
Test and be ineligible for (or lose) tax-exempt status. Thus, the Operational Test assesses not only whether an
organization‘s activities conform to its tax-exempt status, but also whether the organization is engaged in
impermissible activities that are in pursuit of a non-exempt purpose. The line is drawn when the activities,
permissible or impermissible, become ‗substantial.‘‖ Id.
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See id. at 79-80 (discussing Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1970)).

See, e.g., Fed‘n Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 72 T.C. 687 (1979) aff’d Fed‘n Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v.
Comm‘r, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 79 (describing the Federation
case, ―[T]he U.S. Tax Court denied tax-exempt status to a nonprofit corporation organized to provide
prescription drugs at discount prices to the elderly and handicapped. The organization‘s social service mission
was to promote health and relieve financial distress for that charitable class. It discounted drugs and even
provided a delivery service when necessary. Additionally, the corporation had many characteristics frequently
associated with a nonprofit organization . . . . Unfortunately for Federation Pharmacy, the U.S. Tax Court could
not differentiate it from any other for-profit drugstore . . . . In short, Federation Pharmacy failed the Operational
Test because it substantially engaged in activity with a non-exempt (i.e., commercial) purpose, rendering it
ineligible for tax-exempt status . . . . In Federation Pharmacy, the court found that Federation Pharmacy‘s
commercial operations did not further its stated social purpose.‖).
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those purposes must be exclusively exempt purposes, i.e. charitable.163 The Nonprofit
Organization will be deemed as operating exclusively for the charitable (tax-exempt) purpose
if substantially all of its operations are devoted to the charitable purpose or purposes.164
The Board, ultimately responsible for the management of the organization, is also
responsible in its oversight function to prevent mission drift evidenced by or caused by the
commercialism.165 Since top management and other designated authorities usually perform
aspects of the oversight function for the Board, oversight implicates the responsibilities of
the Board and Others. Mission drift occurs when the activities of the Nonprofit
Organization no longer relate to or support, in large part, the mission of the organization.166
The traditional role of the Board of Nonprofit Organizations is that it serves as the
―‗guardians of the charity‘s mission.‖167 Though mission drift is often a gradual occurrence,
the Board should consider that possibility when making the initial decision to enter into
commercial activities.168 Moreover, mission drift may be an intentional or unintentional
occurrence.169 As part of corporate governance, the Board needs to be vigilant to ensure
that the time and activities allocated to a commercialized venture do not erode and erase the
mission and values of the Nonprofit Organizations.170 Still, an activity that seemingly runs
counter to the purpose of the Nonprofit Organization may actually support the mission.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 71 T.C. 202, 209-10 (1978); Lasprogata & Cotton,
supra note 3, at 78; I.R.S., Exemption Requirements - § 501(c)(3) Organizations, Nov. 15, 2010,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html.
163

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2008); see also Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 78 (stating that ―if more
than an insubstantial amount of the [nonprofit‘s] activities are not in furtherance of its exempt purposes, it will
not qualify as a charitable organization defined in Section 501(c)(3)‖).
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PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 111, at 13 (―The board must protect the assets of the
organization and provide oversight to ensure that its financial, human and material resources are used
appropriately to further the organization‘s mission.‖); Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 1, 8 (indicating that directors
are responsible for ―directing and overseeing the management of corporate affairs‖); see also I.R.S. POSITION
PAPER, supra note 55, at § 5 (articulating the duty ―to ensure that financial resources are used to further charitable
purposes and that the organization‘s funds are appropriately accounted for‖); Tuckman, supra note 4, at 506
(stating that many mission statements are written in broad, unfocused, and all-encompassing terms, making it
difficult to tell when the activities of a nonprofit are causing it to drift away from its intended mission. As a
result, individual nonprofits and their boards are largely free to judge whether an activity is mission
appropriate.‖). Id.
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See infra Section IV. B.

Tuckman, supra note 4, at 506. ―It can be intentional, as when a nonprofit consciously decides to redirect its
activities in a new direction, when it is influenced to seek a new direction through government or donor pressure
or it may be unintentional, as when thought is not given to the effects of commercial activity and the organization
gradually addresses its output of goods and services to a different mission over time.‖
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See Tuckman, supra note 4, at 504; Dennis R. Young & Lester M. Salamon, Commercialization, Social Ventures, and
For-Profit Competition, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 423, 442 (2002); Estelle James, Commercialism and the
Mission of Nonprofits, SOC‘Y. J. 29, 29 (2003) (―So long as the charitable goal of the nonprofit remains the driving
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and the sector.‖). But see, Dees, supra note 4, at 10-11 (stating that ―[w]hen philanthropists invest in enterprises,
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impact, or that safeguards are in place should financial rewards ever threaten to pull the organization away from
the desired social impact‖); Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 3, at 86.
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The Board should carefully monitor mission drift for corporate governance purposes
because it is often challenging to detect.171 With mission drift, the Nonprofit Organization
would fail the Operational Test.172 One of the biggest challenges for the Nonprofit
Organization is to prevent mission drift and stay focused on the goals of the organization. 173
This challenge is particularly relevant with regards to Nonprofit Organizations that engage in
commercialism.
The Board should recognize the distinction between commercialism that benefits
the Nonprofit Organization‘s mission and commercialism that distorts it.174 Commercial
activity can cause philanthropic behavior to change. In this way, those with a duty of care,
performing the oversight function, should not assume that an organization and individuals
that were once philanthropic will stay philanthropic, especially when involved in commercial
ventures.175 Further, commercialism may encourage the Nonprofit Organization‘s Board
and Others to give in to the force of popular will, instead of firmly pursuing the mission.176
Succumbing to this pressure could result in the questionable situation of a Nonprofit
Organization claiming a mission but not pursuing it, and potentially, the organization
running afoul of laws and rules that govern its status as a Nonprofit Organization.
To be vigilant for mission drift, the Board and Others should consider as part of
their oversight function, among other things, setting up a compliance program that monitors
such issues.177 For example, a compliance program should monitor the hiring or increased
involvement of people in the day-to-day functioning of the organization‘s business who may
be driven by personal gain and, therefore, spend the majority of their time on for-profit
activities, neglecting or completely losing the mission of philanthropy. Similarly, a
compliance program should monitor people‘s reallocation of work pursuits towards the
commercial activities and away from the philanthropic activities that support the mission. A
commercial venture may pressure Nonprofit Organizations to neglect certain aspects of their
philanthropic activities that support the mission. Moreover, there may be conflicts of
interest between the mission of the Nonprofit Organization and the intent of the
commercial activities. For instance, money that is raised in the philanthropic, noncommercial activities may end up being channeled towards the betterment of for-profit
activities or actually bailing out failed commercial projects, including cross-sector
collaborations.178 These concepts are symptomatic but not necessarily conclusive. It is,
171

Tuckman, supra note 4.

172

See infra Section IV and note 160.

Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits, Q & A with: Herman B. Leonard, HARVARD BUSINESS
SCHOOL (Oct. 27, 2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html.
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See James, supra note 170, at 29-30.
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Tuckman, supra note 4, at 505, 506-07.
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See Young & Salamon, supra note 170, at 442.

See Runquist & Malamut, supra note 55, at 31-32 (stating that while the IRS Code does not require these types
of policies and procedures, the implication from Form 990 is that a well-run nonprofit would have policies and
procedures such as conflicts of interest policy, whistle-blower policy, record retention and destruction policy,
compensation policy, joint venture policy (which is relevant to joint ventures with for-profit partners), Form 990
disclosure policy, and governance disclosure policy). Id.
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however, incumbent upon the directors (and by implication the Board and Others) to
provide the oversight function required by the duty of care and to implement mechanisms to
monitor and address these types of activities.179 This means creating and implementing a
strategy and system to accomplish the mission and goals in light of the commercial
venture.180 The strategy should include actions and decision-making that aligns with the
values and mission of the organization.
A director of a Nonprofit Organization has a duty to oversee the corporate
compliance programs of the organization, including ensuring that activity is directed towards
the purpose of furthering the mission. In dicta, the court in In re Caremark International, Inc.,
Derivate Litigation identified the duty of the director to oversee the organization‘s compliance
programs.181 The Caremark court stated that the director‘s duty includes a good faith attempt
to assure that: (i) a corporate information and reporting system exists and is adequate based
on Board determination; and (ii) the organization‘s information and reporting system is
adequate to capture and provide reliable and appropriate information to the Board
concerning organizational compliance with applicable laws in a timely way and in the
ordinary course of business.182 The Board will need to determine the relevant types of
information and the necessary details to monitor in order for the Board to serve its
function.183 The Caremark court determined that in certain circumstances, a director‘s failure
to reasonably oversee the implementation and continued application of this system could be
a breach of the director‘s duty of care.184 The Caremark court described the conditions for
liability for failure to oversee compliance programs where the appropriate individuals: (a)
―utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having
implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring
their attention.‖185 The liability attaches if, under this standard, the individual knew he was
not performing a fiduciary duty, thereby evidencing a conscious disregard of that duty.

Id. For specific industries, some governmental and non-governmental organizations have provided guidance
for these compliance systems. See OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg.
4958 (Jan. 31, 2005); OIG Compliance Program for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (Feb 23, 1998). Arguably,
failure to ensure these compliance programs may be considered ―obstruction of justice‖ pursuant to the terms of
Sections 802 and 1102 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Peregrine, supra note 2, at § 36.
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Id.; Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006) (assessing oversight
liability using Caremark); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64-67 (Del. 2006) (addressing
corporate fiduciary duty).
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note 2, at § 36.
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CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE

A nonprofit entrepreneur is someone who responds to the changing
environment of that sector by designing new ways to create value for his or
her organization. Nonprofit entrepreneurs are social entrepreneurs. They
recognize and relentlessly pursue new opportunities that serve their
mission. They engage in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation
and learning. They act boldly without being limited to resources currently
in hand. They also exhibit a heightened sense of accountability to the
constituencies served and for the outcome created.186
In an effort to keep from fading away, Nonprofit Organizations engage more and
more in commercialism, which may blur the boundaries between the Nonprofit
Organization and for-profit organizations. Some argue that commercialism is, in fact, the
strongest force shaping non-profit business these days.187 While a for-profit business is
organized and operated to pursue corporate profit and gains to the shareholders, a
Nonprofit Organization‘s organization and operation must substantially tract in line with its
philanthropic mission.188 ―[Nonprofits] need to be understood within the context of
increasingly open and competitive national and international markets.‖189 On the one hand,
Nonprofit Organizations are under heightened scrutiny which underscores the importance
of corporate governance, and, on the other hand, they have a legitimate concern for the
bottom line and finding new and improved programs to prop up the bottom line while
achieving the mission.190 While Nonprofit Organizations seek to increase independence and
viability, commercialism has deeper implications.191
From the perspective of the Board and Others, status as a Nonprofit Organization
does not mean that the organization should never make a profit. Instead, pursuant to
mission limitation and the private inurement doctrine, the profit must be used in support of
the mission and cannot be paid out to a shareholder or to another residual claimant. When
considering a decision to enter into a commercial venture, the Nonprofit Organization‘s
Board and Others, as required by duties of loyalty and care, should ensure that the intended
goals and operations of the commercial venture align with the Nonprofit Organization‘s
mission192 and that there is a system to ensure continued alignment. The Board and Others
must realize that the Nonprofit Organization may conduct commercial activity to reasonably
support its mission so long as the activity does not cause the Nonprofit Organization to
violate the applicable laws or experience mission drift.193 If involvement in the commercial
186
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venture drifts from the original path and endangers the Nonprofit Organization‘s mission
(and tax-exempt status), there should be safety measures in place to ensure a proper and
legal response.194
In the developing law of Nonprofit Organizations, it can be argued that because the
mission of the Nonprofit Organization is the primary focus, plenty of discretion should be
provided to the Board and Others to interpret the Nonprofit Organization‘s mission and
operations related thereto. This approach would modify the traditional fiduciary doctrine
applied to Nonprofit Organizations, which was derived from that of for-profit organizations
and either underappreciated or did not include the mission consideration in its analysis.195
Drawing a parallel to the business judgment rule, this new approach is something like a
mission judgment rule, providing freedom to those holding the fiduciary duty to make
decisions but requiring them to, in good faith, consider and factor in the Nonprofit
Organization‘s mission. In addition, a mission-focused approach would provide a more
relevant and ―sustainable doctrinal basis for assessing [the Board and Others‘] conduct under
the duty of loyalty.‖196
Critics who assert that the Nonprofit Organizations are obtaining an unfair
advantage may not fully understand or account for the impact that commercialism has on
the Nonprofit Organizations‘ business, potentially causing considerable complications and
blurring of the distinctions between for-profits and Nonprofit Organizations.197 Managed
correctly by the Board and Others, these changes may be viewed as entrepreneurial,
admirable, and promising as they foreshadow greater independence and stability for nonprofits.198 Independent of the arguments from the critics, the levels of philanthropic needs
today require more services in the face of fewer resources.199 Redefining the Nonprofit
Organization‘s relationship with the market economy may be necessary for the success of
Nonprofit Organizations in the future.200 The law of Nonprofit Organizations was largely
derived from or modeled from the law applicable to for-profits; it follows, then, that an
organization that wants to establish a lasting impact for a philanthropic missions is wise to
include for-profit business methods and market-oriented approaches as reasonable parts of
the overall business operations.201
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Similarly, in the case of the Nonprofit Organization, the Board and Others have
what seems to be a simultaneous obligation to ensure both the furtherance of the mission
and the financial stability of the organization. As a result, corporate governance, by means
of fiduciary duties, needs to be shifted for the Nonprofit Organization as it relates to that of
the for-profit, to instead make the mission the recognized purpose of the Nonprofit
Organization. In further recognition of the challenge of measuring success and providing
accountability, adequate discretion (different from the for-profit context) should be allotted
Nonprofit Organization‘s directors to interpret the organization‘s mission. With such
discretion, analysis of fiduciary duties in the Nonprofit Organization context should
reference mission-focused values instead of the traditional reference points of fiduciary duty
analysis related to for-profits, which tend to ignore the mission concept.202 This approach
would underscore the relevance of the mission to the corporate governance evaluations and
better ensure that the directors integrate the mission into their decision-making process and
oversight function within the duty of care. Further, the emphasis on the mission would
make a clearer basis for determining when the duty of loyalty is upheld or not.203 It is also
important to consider that while internal controls are essential, a balance needs to be struck
with just the right amount of emphasis. A certain degree of emphasis may stifle innovation
in subtle or not so subtle ways. This could affect morale and with the shifting of emphasis
to compliance programs, resources that would have otherwise possibly gone to development
of new ideas might be dispensed other ways.204 This is undoubtedly a challenging and
delicate balance to achieve. ―Just as free-market ideologues should not assume that fraud
carries no social costs, neither should regulators assume that compliance is free.‖205

They are not claiming that all social problems are amenable to market-based solutions or that any major social
problem will be solved by business methods alone.‖).
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